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and Intellectual Freedom 
DAVIDV. WARD 
ABSTRACT 
THISARTICLE SURVEYS A VARIETY of philosophical arguments 
concerning censorship and intellectual freedom in relation to specific 
contemporary events. T h e  paper argues that deontological 
considerations concerning censorship and intellectual freedom take 
precedence over consequen tialist arguments. 
Recent times have seen a startling variety of events involving 
issues of free expression. Salman Rushdie has been condemned to 
death for writing a book allegedly insulting to Islam; his publisher 
and bookstores carrying T h e  Satanic Verses have also been threatened 
with violence. A significant political battle has erupted following 
a Supreme Court decision which held that burning the American 
flag is a protected form of expression under the First Amendment. 
Some feminists have joined with those elements of the political Right 
wishing to ban pornography. The distribution and display of two 
recent films, Scorsese’s T h e  Last Temptation of Christ and Godard’s 
Hail  Mary, have been attacked as has the subsidy of a exhibition 
by publicly supported institutions of photographs by Robert 
Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano. The University of Michigan and 
the University of Wisconsin, among the other colleges and 
universities, have adopted restrictions on speech deemed degrading 
or racist, and a number of school libraries have been pressured to 
remove books ranging from Cleaver’s Soul on Ice to Twain’s 
Huckleberry Finn alleged to be unsuitable for children because of 
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their political or sexual content. On national security grounds, the 
government of Great Britain attempted to block the publication of 
Peter Wright’s Spycatcher. 
The often confused nature of the public discussion of these and 
other events, as well as their increasing frequency, suggests that we 
are unclear about the underlying principles at stake, and shows the 
need for a re-examination of the philosophical underpinnings of 
freedom of expression, with careful attention to the distinction 
between what is, and what is not, properly regarded as a problem 
of intellectual freedom and censorship. That reexamination is the 
primary purpose of this article. 
The first task is to lay out the ethical theories under which issues 
of censorship and free expression can be evaluated. There are two 
basic types of moral theories: consequentialist theories and  
deontological theories. This discussion will regard utiltarianism, the 
pre-eminent consequentialist theory, and a variety of deontological 
concerns. 
Consequentialist moral theories are those which hold that the 
rightness of an action is determined solely by the degree to which 
it produces good consequences. Utilitarianism is a consequentialist 
theory which holds that the best actions are those which produce 
the greatest amount of good (understood as pleasure or happiness) 
for the greatest number of people. It is the moral theory underlying 
modern cost-benefit and risk-benefit analysis, according to which we 
are directed to choose the action with the most favorable ratio of 
cost or risks to benefits. 
Deontological theories, the most important alternative to 
consequentialism, hold that the rightness of an action depends upon 
factors other than the consequences of the action. These include such 
things as whether the intentions with which the act is done were 
good, whether the action is just, whether i t  respects the rights of 
those affected by it, whether the action is consistent with the demands 
of duty, and whether, whatever its consequences, something in the 
nature of the action makes i t  intrinsically wrong. There are a variety 
of deontological theorists, from the first deontologist, Immanuel 
Kant, to W. D. Ross in the twentieth century. This discussion is 
neutral among them for our interest is in the deontological form 
of argument rather that in the specifics of any particular deontological 
theory. 
Our first major problem is whether issues of intellectual freedom 
are to be decided primarily by appeal to utilitarianism or to 
deontological considerations. That is, we must determine which of 
the two ethical theories expresses the more fundamental and 
overriding moral concerns. 
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The classical objection to utilitarianism is that i t  makes 
insufficient provision for considerations of rights and justice. 
Utilitarianism, it is argued, would countenance, even mandate, 
actions which violated individuals’ rights or which were unjust in 
other ways, so long as those actions maximized utility. This objection 
is a sound one. Rights take precedence over utility; thus, deontological 
theories take precedence over consequentialist theories. 
This is not to say that utilitarian arguments are wrong or 
worthless, only that they do not express the most fundamental truths 
about ethical issues. In disputes in which injustice or violation of 
rights is not at issue, or in which equally balanced rights claims 
offset each other, i t  is often the case that utilitarian arguments 
determine the issue. Additionally, utilitarian arguments can be used 
in support of deontological arguments. The claim that deontological 
concerns take precedence over considerations of utility means only 
that in cases of conflict, rights and justice are more important than 
is maximization of utility. Deontological arguments cannot be 
answered by utilitarian counter-arguments, but need to be dealt with 
directly in deontological terms. This will prove of great practical 
significance when we begin to apply these ethical theories to a number 
of recent controversies involving freedom of expression. First, 
however, we must lay out the arguments concerning freedom of 
expression from both ethical perspectives. 
In Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, J. 
S. Mill (1950), the leading proponent of utilitarianism, gives an 
elegant and detailed defense of freedom of expression. He offers four 
arguments against censorship. The first is that: 
the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly 
be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but 
they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question 
for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of 
judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that 
it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute 
certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. 
(pp. 104-05) 
Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, 
i t  may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we 
suppress the speech which contains it. 
The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion 
“however true i t  may be, if i t  is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly 
discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 
1951, p. 126). Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points 
out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding 
of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof 
against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be 
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held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus 
held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the 
words which enunciate a truth” (p. 127). 
Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding 
which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger 
of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the 
character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, 
inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing 
the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or 
personal experience” (p. 149). 
Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, 
whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of 
suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it  makes it less 
likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and i t  is wrong 
because it  has destructive consequences for the intellectual character 
of those who live under it. 
Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and 
of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people 
are entitled to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the 
expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects 
of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form 
of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions 
of others. 
Natural rights theories, such as John Locke’s, grounded these 
entitlements in God-given natural rights. According to Locke, human 
rights are founded on “natural law,” and in Essays on  the Law of 
Nature he holds that natural law derives ultimately from God’s will. 
The concept of natural law is exceedingly vague, but in general the 
doctrine held that persons may come to know by reason the 
fundamental principles of morality which are otherwise known by 
Christian revelation. 
The view that human rights derive from Divine grant enjoyed 
only a brief flourishing in philosophy, from the middle of the 
seventeenth into the early eighteenth centuries, to be replaced first 
by utilitarianism and later by positivism. 
The idea that rights were granted by the Creator was rejected 
in part because it is unverifiable in principle. It introduces a 
particularly murky form of mysticism into political philosophy. Just 
which rights did God grant to humans? If one theorist’s claims about 
which rights humans possess by nature conflict with those of another 
thinker, how in principle could such a dispute be resolved? 
But the relatively brief life of natural rights theory occurred at 
just the right time to influence the political ideas of the American 
founding fathers, who built the doctrine of natural rights, now largely 
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regarded as a quaint philosophical curio, into the Constitution and 
Declaration of Independence. It is, for instance, the Lockean view 
of natural rights which impelled both Jefferson and Madison to their 
absolutist views of the First Amendment. Jefferson carried the view 
so far as to hold that: “Libels, falsehood, and defamation, equally 
with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognizance of 
federal tribunals.” 
Other rights theories eliminate the controversial theological step, 
claiming only that rights follow from the nature of human beings 
(whether God is responsible for that nature or not). Consider the 
following argument, which Kant did not make, but which I take 
to be implied by his views. Humans are ends in themselves, Kant 
says, and the most important fact about them is that they are 
autonomous, self-determining, rational agents. Restrictions on the 
transmission of information or ideas which interfere with the exercise 
of this rational autonomy are thus incompatible with a fundamental 
feature of human nature, and so are impermissible. 
In any case, whether grounded in Divine grant or not, a 
deontological theory of rights holds that individuals have them 
independently of the consequences of their possession and exercise. 
I turn now to comment on the relevance of these philosophical 
ideas to some of the recent disputes which are referred to in this 
article. The first issue is the recent attack by some feminists on the 
legal availability of pornography. Historically, the arguments over 
pornography pitted a deontological rights argument in favor of 
permitting freedom of expression and the legal distribution of 
pornography against a consequentialist one opposing its legal 
distribution. The major argument against pornography was its 
putative bad effect on the morals and behavior of those exposed to 
it. Pornography was alleged to result in sexual violence and other 
undesirable sexual behavior. Not surprisingly, the rights arguments 
protecting free expression usually won out over these consequentialist 
objections, for, as we have seen, rights take precedence over utility. 
The consequentialist opponents of pornography were in a very weak 
position, for not only were their claims about the effects of 
pornography contentious and controversial, but even if the alleged 
bad consequences were shown to result from pornography, it would 
not follow that is was permissible to ban it. The exercise of one’s 
rights does not depend on the felicitousness of the consequences of 
that exercise. 
The recent feminist arguments have introduced new elements 
into the debate. In addition to the traditional argument that 
pornography should be banned because it  causes harm (e.g., violence 
against women), we have the new claim that pornography violates 
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human rights because i t  is degrading to women. That is, the 
deontological rights argument in favor of free expression is now being 
challenged by an opposing rights argument, rather than by the pr ima  
facie weaker consequentialist objections to pornography. 
The argument is in some ways similar to objections raised by 
some Muslims to the publication of Satanic Verses. The claim was 
that publication of this book was wrong because the novel was 
insulting to Islam, that it degraded that religion. These are serious 
deontological objections, and in both cases require a straightforward 
response. 
Some have attempted to answer these objections by claiming 
that Satanic Verses is not insulting to Islam or that pornography 
is not degrading to women. But this strategy just misses the central 
point which is that neither a gender nor a religion have the right 
not to be insulted or degraded. 
I would argue that pornography, at least that depicting the violent 
subordination of women, not only degrades women but men as well 
by depicting them as enjoying the violent subjugation of women. 
But this just does not entail that such pornography should be banned. 
A good deal of protected speech is arguably unfairly insulting or 
degrading or demeaning to some identifiable group or other, but, 
excepting the cases of literal slander and libel (in which specific 
individuals are identified), people have no right not to be insulted 
or characterized in degrading terms. The cure for such bad speech, 
as often pointed out, is good speech, not prohibition. In fact, elevating 
the undesirability of the degrading nature of pornography to the 
status of a right not to be degraded is a danger to the power of 
rights to protect legitimate human autonomy. The broader our rights 
claims are, whether for education, welfare, employment, housing, 
or freedom from the insulting nature of some pornography, the less 
plausible those claims are, for the more frequent their conflict with 
other, equally plausible rights claims. In general, claims of so-called 
“positive” rights, such as a “right to a job” are less plausible than 
those of “negative” rights, such as the right to free speech. This 
is because the former require that others take positive steps toward 
providmg the right-holder with the object of the right (in the example, 
a job), while “negative” rights require only that others refrain from 
interfering in the actions of the rights-holder. The right to free speech 
is the right not to have one’s speech interfered with. Requiring that 
other members of society not interfere with a person’s speech in no 
way violates or even threatens to violate their rights. However, 
requiring members of society to take positive action to provide a 
job, or education, or health care, etc., may conflict with their rights. 
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The upshot of this is that the pornographer and the consumers 
of pornography (as well as the author and readers of Satanic Verses), 
are in an extremely strong philosophical position. They claim only 
the right not to be interfered with in their expression and consumption 
of expression. It would take a strong argument indeed to supersede 
this rights claim, an argument which has so far not been forthcoming. 
The second issue in this discussion is the controversy surrounding 
the grant of public money from the National Endowment for the 
Arts to support an exhibition of photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe 
and Andres Serrano. Several of the photographs in the exhibition, 
including Serrano’s Piss Christ (in which a crucifix is shown immersed 
in what the artist says is urine), and a number of sado-masochistic 
homoerotic images by Mapplethorpe (including one depicting one 
man urinating into the mouth of another, as well as erotic images 
of children), provoked great controversy. A number of federal 
legislators objected to the use of public funds for the support of 
artistic expression which they (or their constituents) found offensive 
or obscene, and they proposed legislation to prohibit the National 
Endowment for the Arts to subsidize obscene art in the future. 
Whatever the merits of exhibitions of Mapplethorpe’s or Serrano’s 
work, this case is not properly construed as a freedom of expression 
issue. No one (at least no responsible person) in the furor surrounding 
the exhibition of these photographs suggested that the artists had 
no right to produce them, or that anyone had the right to forbid 
the exhibition of these works. What was at issue was whether 
taxpayers’ money should be used to support these artistic expressions. 
Subsidy, not censorship, is the issue in this case. And failing to 
subsidize expression is not the same as suppressing expression. 
Freedom of expression is the right not to have one’s speech coercively 
interfered with; i t  is not the right to be provided with the resources 
necessary to produce and distribute speech. Freedom of the press, 
in other words, is not the right to be provided with a printing press, 
but only the right not to have others interfere with the operation 
of one’s press. 
No one’s rights are violated by failing to subsidize the exhibition 
of Mapplethorpe and Serano’s photographs. The artists had no right 
to such a subsidy, nor did the institutions which produced the 
exhibition, nor the prospective audience .for the exhibition. The 
legitimate claim of right here has to do with the right of the citizens 
in a democratic society to choose (through their legislators) which 
art they wish to support and which they do not. The mandate of 
the National Endowment for the Arts (and other such bodies) derives 
from an expression of the popular will through the legislature. This 
mandate therefore can also be modified or rescinded by popular will, 
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in the form of legislative act, as i t  was in this case. It would be 
hard to argue, in other words, that the taxpayers did not have the 
right to determine what they are and are not willing to support be 
i t  artistic expression or any other service or commodity. 
This is not the same thing, though, as arguing that the popular 
will is wise in what it chooses to support. One might argue that 
an enlightened electorate would choose to support artistic expression, 
even controversial expression, not because the artist or audience has 
a right to subsidy but rather on the sorts of utilitarian grounds 
provided by Mill. 
This line of reasoning has consequences for what I take to be 
a more important issue than the subsidy of controversial works of 
art. That is the issue of removal or banning of books from publicly 
supported libraries (including public school libraries) because of their 
political, sexual, racial, or ethnic content. What is the ethical position 
for the librarian in such cases? The libraries in question are publicly 
supported. Doesn’t this give the public the right to determine which 
books will and will not be included in the collection? Isn’t the 
librarian a public employee, obligated to carry out the public’s will, 
as expressed through the appropriate elected officials? 
The answer to these questions is “yes,” but an importantly 
qualified “yes.” It is true that no one’s rights are violated if the 
taxpayers remove Huckleberry Finn or Soul on Ice from a tax-
supported library. The taxpayers are exercising their acknowledged 
right to decide what they will and will not support, just as in the 
Mapplethorpe/Serrano case. And the librarian, i f  he or she is to remain 
in that position, must acknowledge the public’s rights to be selective 
about what i t  wants in libraries i t  pays for. 
This does not mean that we, or the librarian, must agree with 
the public’s position. What librarians can do in such cases is to 
articulate the important consequen tialist reasons for not removing 
books. In the passion of the moment, the public might rashly choose 
to ban what i t  regards as a particularly outrageous book from the 
public library with no thought to the difficult to discern and serious 
long-term costs imposed by a policy which allowed such removals. 
The librarian is in a special position to aid the public in understanding 
that, while i t  has the right to remove or ban books from publicly 
supported institutions, doing so is unwise. Such removals are wrong 
and constitute bad public policy just because the long-term 
consequences may be disastrous. 
The points of this article can be summarized in a few succinct 
ideas. Deontological rights-based arguments for intellectual freedom 
and against censorship are stronger than, and take precedence over, 
consequen tialist considerations. Utilitarian counter arguments fail 
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against arguments based on justice or rights. This precedence however 
must not serve as a motive for attempting to turn all that is desirable 
into a right. The inflation of rights, by conflating the merely desirable 
with the obligatory, dilutes the rights which protect us all. 
But when rights issues are not at stake, or when conflicting 
plausible rights claims produce a “deontological stand-off,” 
consequentialist arguments, especially those of Mill, are authoritative. 
To say that such arguments are secondary to deontological 
considerations in no way diminishes their validity in those situations 
where they correctly apply. 
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